Nota técnica sobre la revelación de información asimétrica y la microestructura en los mercados financieros
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Dos de las inquietudes interesantes en los mercados financieros internacionales están relacionadas en cómo se logran los equilibrios competitivos en las ofertas al contado (spot) y de futuros en dichos mercados financieros, y si hay posibilidad en dichos mercados de “manipular” la conducta y los resultados. En la literatura se pueden hallar explicaciones en términos de los equilibrios de Nash, la microestructura del mercado, la evidencia empírica, la revelación de información, las subastas y el diseño del mercado. El artículo presenta los conceptos sobre la revelación de información asimétrica en los mercados financieros, ejemplos de la conducta y reglas institucionales en mercados financieros especializados, y evidencia del ejercicio del poder de mercado en mercados físicos y financieros en electricidad. Se provee el concepto de competencia normal y el articulo concluye con ideas que deben tomarse en cuenta en el diseño de los mercados financieros.
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